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SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENCE SWINDLING
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INTRODUCTION

Almost twenty years ago L. L. Bernard, noting the prevalence of various types of
fraud in American society, stated: "We have reached the fraud stage of social control
in the evolution of successsion of forms in social control."' There seems little doubt
that today we are still in what Bernard terms the fraud stage of development.
Swindling appears to be a strongly entrenched national phenomenon, many instances
of which are reported daily in newspapers throughout the country.
Though fraud of course takes on a wide variety of forms, from a sociological view
almost all fraud can be seen to contain the kernel of the "confidence game" procedure
-the creation, by one means or another, of a relation of confidence, through which a
swindle is effected. All types of con games fall into a general pattern which may be
described briefly as follows. The swindler (or swindlers, for several racketeers often
band together to form a "con mob") selects a person who appears likely to be a good
"sucker" (or, in the argot of the con man, "mark"). After establishing some degree of
rapport with the mark, and once he sees that the mark will trust him, the con man
tells the mark of a dishonest scheme by which they can make some money. The mark
gives the swindler his money, which he never again sees. Because he has placed his
confidence in the con man, it never occurs to the mark (until it is too late) that he is
the object rather than the co-perpetrator of the swindle.
Unfortunately there is no way to accurately gauge the extent of criminal fraud in
the United States today. Victims of con games (who, themselves, sought to gain
dishonestly) rarely report their losses; many victims of related types of fraud never
fully realize they were "taken." And where the loss is small, the victim often prefers
not to bother getting involved with the police. Thus especially in the realm of fraud,
"crimes known to the police" fall far short of crimes actually committed.
Despite the uncertainty, experts agree on the magnitude of the fraud problem.
According to Maurer, it may well be that "The three big-con games, the wire, the
rag, and the pay-off, have in some forty years of their existence.... produced
more illicit profit for the operators and for the law than all other forms of professional
crime (excepting violations of prohibition law) over the same period of time." 2 And
2

BEmx-ARD, L. L., SocIAL CONTROL, New York: Macmillan, 1939, p. 36.
M.ArREP. DAVID, TE Bio CoN,, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, p. 17.
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the most recent edition of the late Professor Sutherland's competent text reports:
"It is probable... that fraud is the most prevalent crime in America." 3
Current efforts to curb fraud are typically ineffectual. As noted above, the reporting
of fraudulent crimes is minimal. Then too, the variety of statures relevant to various
kinds of fraud is, in many jurisdictions, close to chaotic: "Enact, as Colorado has
done, some two dozen statutes on the general topic of obtaining property illegally
and confusion is bound to result." 4 In some states, there are separate statutes covering larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, confidence game, and forgery. This may
enable a defendant to play one provision off against another-against a larceny
charge raising a defense that the evidence shows embezzlement, then reversing his
stand in a subsequent embezzlement trial. Composite larceny statutes in New York
and California undoubtedly simplify the law-enforcement-prosecution task. New
York's law is particularly well-drafted in that it makes irrelevant the thorny questions
of possession as against title which plague prosecutors in many states.5
Another difficulty for prosecutors arises because of the general rule of criminal
law that a false pretense or representation, to be indictable, must be an untrue
statement regarding a past or present fact. While a leading California decision recently held that false promises are false pretenses', the outdated common law doctrine
is still the majority rule. Exacting evidenciary requirements under specific statutes,
together with the possibilities of professional swindlers "fixing" cases, further inhibit
successful prosecution of fraud.
Even where statutes have been simplified so that the required proof would not
hinder prosecution law-enforcement authorities and courts seem reluctant to give
fraud laws a broad application, particularly where a segment of the business community might be imperiled. For instance, under the Federal Mail Fraud Act, there
need be no showing that anyone is in fact defrauded and promissory fraud as well as
misrepresentation of past and present fact is indictable; yet the government has
relied largely on the noncriminal "fraud order" technique, rather than using the
criminal sanctions also provided by the Act. An important element seems to be the
"reluctance to stigmatize the overzealous advertiser as a criminal."'7
Where sanctions are imposed in swindling cases, they are rarely stringent; prison
statistics show that, generally, sentences imposed in this country for fraud are relatively light. Fraud offenders, then, are rarely uncovered and even more rarely prosecuted; of those who are prosecuted, most are at least able to avoid serious punishment. The. con game, perhaps the nucleus of much American fraud, is particularly
untouchable because of the victim's equivocal position.
The extent to which particular criminal statutes are unenforceable should not be
attributed to chance factors. If the law's efforts to curb fraud seem of no avail, the
3 SuTi E.RND, EDwiN H., PRiNcIrPLES OF CRUNOLOGY, New York: Lippincott, 5th ed. rev.
Cressey, 1955, p. 42.
4 HEGARTY, JAms E., False Preltenses, Confidence Game and Short Check in Colorado, 25 Rocxy
MTn. L. Rxv. 325 (1953).
5Nxw YoRK PFNAi LAw, Sec. 1290 (Clevenger-Gilbert, 1951).
GPeople v. Ashley, 267 P2d 271 (1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 900 (1954); Note, False Promises as
False Pretenses,43 CAL. L. REv. 719 (1955).
7Note, The Regidation of Advertising, 56 CoL. L. REv. 1018,1041 (1956).
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answer lies not merely in the cleverness of the swindler and the inadequacy of current
police techniques for fraud-detection. To understand the real meaning of the fraud
problem in America, one must turn to an analysis of the social dynamics of fraud and
the con game within the modern American social system.
SWVINDLING AS INTERACTION

An important element in an analysis of fraud (particularly in the confidence game
situation) centers around the fact that the con game is, in a very real sense, a game.
Though the term con game probably originated with the situations in which a swindler would induce his victim to compete in a "game of chance" (from which the "
swindler had carefully eliminated the chance element), it has been carried over to
cover quite (superficially) different situations. Perhaps too little attention has been
paid the interesting fact that confidence rackets are called "games", while most
other criminal offenses receive (even from their practitioners) far less playful appellations.
Sociology has long recognized the great significance, for understanding human
action, of play and games. Georg Simmel wrote:
All the forms of interaction or sociation among men-the wish to outdo, exchange, formation of
parties, the desire to wrest something from the other, the hazards of accidental meetings and separations, the change between enmity and cooperation, the overpowering by ruse and revenge-in the
seriousness of reality, all of these are imbued with purposive contents. In the game, they lead their
own lives; they are propelled exclusively by their own attraction. For even where the game involves
a monetary stake .... to the person who really enjoys it, its attraction rather lies in the dynamics
and hazards of the sociologically significant forms of activity themselves. The more profound, double
sense of "social game" is that not only the game is played
in a society (as its external medium) but
8
that, with itshell), people actually "play" "society.".

As George H. Mead suggested, the development of the human "self" may be
illustrated by the child's participation first in play and later in the organized game.
In the earlier stage of pure play the child typically "takes on" the roles of particular
persons he sees about him; he plays at being other people. In the organized game
stage, there is more complex role-playing, the self emerges through the creation of a
"generalized other", and the game has rules which must be followed.' Interestingly
enough, the confidence game would seem to embody aspects of both these stages.
Certainly the "taking on" of another's role, the playing at being someone else, so
characteristic of Mead's pure-play stage, is a prime factor in confidence swindling.
At the same time there is little doubt that, at least from the swindler's standpoint,
the con game has rules which must be followed and is the sort of game where "taking
the attitude of the other" (one of Mead's favorite phrases) may be vitally necessary.
Maurer notes, "Big-time confidence games are in reality only carefully rehearsed
plays in which every member of the cast except the mark knows his part perfectly."'"
8 WOLFF, KURT H. (ed. and tr.), THE SocIoLoGY OF GEORG SIMMEL, Glencoe: The Free Press,
1950, pp. 49-50.
9MEAD, GEORGE H., MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934, 1950, pp.
152-164.
'0 MAURER, op. cit., p. 108.
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Traditionally, criminology has studied crime and the criminal. Little attention has
been paid the victim of criminal offenses; in many instances this is a grave shortcoming. Hans von Hentig pointed out an important but typically ignored fact when
he wrote that, "In a sense the victim shapes and moulds the criminal."" This holds
particularly true for most fraud situations. As Maurer explains:
A confidence man prospers only because of the fundamental dishonesty of his victim.... As the
lust for large and easy profits is fanned into a hot flame, the mark puts all his scruples behind him....
In the mad frenzy of cheating someone else, he is unaware of the fact that he is the real victim,
carefully seleted and fatted for the kill. Thus arises the trite, but none the less sage maxim: "You
2
can't cheat an honest man."'

Similarly, Professor Sutherland quotes one professional con man as follows: "'A
confidence game will fail absolutely unless the sucker has got larceny in his soul.' "'
And as Sutherland went on to note, there is no known case of a prospect declining to
continue with a scheme once he learned it was dishonest.
One writer has argued that the victim's state of mind is completely irrelevant to
the question of whether the crime of false pretenses is committed in a particular case:
Whether the swindler obtains the confidence of his victim seems entirely unimportant if in fact
the swindler intended to defraud and actually does defraud his victim" ...the fraudulent trick or
device is undoubtedly what causes the unwary citizen to lose his property .... To reason 14otherwise
would seem almost to promote dishonesty, and cheating, and to reward artful treachery.

While this approach might make it easier for prosecutors to proceed under false
pretenses laws, it clearly fails to do justice to the actual dynamics of the fraud situation. Is it really the trick or device which "undoubtedly... causes" the citizen to
lose his property? At best, that is only part of the true picture.
Confidence swindlers are generally recognized to be the elite of the underworld.
Proceeds from such fraud can be exceptionally large, the con man tends to be his
own boss (even where several swindlers form a mob), and unlike the "heavy rackets"
swindling involves no violence. While factors such as these help to account for the
swindler's high status in the underworld, there are satisfactions still more basic to
the swindling process which accrue not only to the polished professional confidence
man but all the way down the line to the small-time sharper.
One writer comments, for example, that "Above all, every deception, every imposture is an assumption of power. The person deceived is reduced in stature, symbolically nullified, while the imposter is temporarily powerful, even greater than if he
were the real thing." 5 It may well be that from the psychodynamic standpoint, the
assertion of power over the victim is as important to the swindler (though perhaps
not on the conscious level) as is obtaining the sought-after money or property.
1

VON HENTiG, HANS, THE CRUIINAL AND His VicTru, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1948,
p. 384.
12
MAUIER, op. cit., p. 16.
H., THE PROFESSIO.A THinz, Chicago: Pheonix Books, 1937, 1956,
13 SuTE.RLP-D, EDWnr

p. 69.
11ATTwELL, JOSEPH J., The Confidence Game in Illinois, 49 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 737,
751 (1955).
SKLEiN, ALEXANDER (ed.), GRAND DECEPTION: TAE WORLD'S MOST SPECTACULAR AND SUCCESSFUL HoAxzs, IMOSTURES, RUSES AND FRAUDS, New York: Lippincott, 1955, p. 13.
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Indeed the concepts of power and power relations seem quite appropriate to an
analysis of defrauding. To some extent at least, we may even apply to the fraud situation a few of the ideas currently used in the analysis of small group interaction
processes. For in a sense rivalry, coalition and strategy are of the very essence of
the confidence game. (It is interesting to note in this regard that the term "payoff,"
which features significantly in the analytic scheme developed by von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 6 is also the label given by professional criminals to several of the
more ambitious of the traditional confidence games).
We have seen that the victim has an active role to play in bringing about his own
downfall. Invariably, the swindler convinces the victim that together they can
swindle a third party; this third party, too, must be reckoned with in studying the
structure of power relations inherent in the confidence game situation. One way of
picturing such a triad would be to say that the victim enters into a spurious coalition
with the swindler against an imaginary third party. The would-be alliance between
the con man and his victim is, of course, based wholly on a lie. But as Simmel aptly
stated: "However often a lie may destroy a given relationship, as long as the relationship existed, the lie was an integral element of it. The ethically negative value of the
lie must not blind us to its sociologically quite positive significance for the formation
of certain concrete relations."" Though the victim's alliance with his swindler is
indeed, as he will eventually discover, a spurious one, it is his belief in the lie and his
confidence in the coalition which induces him to act as he does.
Basic to the widespread willingness to play the role of victim in such dramas would
seem to be the desire to get "something for nothing." Again there may be the power
element; the attempt to best a third party may underlie the victim's eagerness. But
it is also interesting to note that potential victims do not seem to learn from their
own or others' past experiences; indeed awareness of the widespread existence of
swindling seems to help little in putting a swindle-prone public on its guard. This may
suggest the presence of a desire (conscious or unconscious) to be victimized. Modern
psychology has stressed the need for punishment which plays an important role in
unconscious life, particularly among criminal offenders; this need is often illustrated
by the frequency with which offenders betray themselves by leaving some telltale clue
at the scene of the crime. A similar mechanism may operate to promote a willingness
to be defrauded.
The potential victim is probably quite aware that the plan of action his confidant
proposes is "wrong." Under such circumstances, he may harbor a strong ambivalence
about winning; he may almost sense that he is to be swindled, but may unconsciously
desire to be punished for his own wrongdoing. The question whether such selfdefeating mechanisms should be attributed to a basic "death wish" or masochism
must be left to the psychoanalysts.
A

STRTJCTLMRAL JIL-mIOALIV

Most American studies of fraud and related offenses have been oriented to the
individual offender, whose depredations are usualiy explained in terms of what may
16 VON NxUMA ,,

JOHN AND OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAME.S AD EcONOIEEC BEHAVIOR,

Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1947.
17 WOLFF, op. cit., p. 316.
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be called a "situational approach." Thus the conclusion of Lottier, based on firsthand study of embezzlers in a court's psychopathic clinic: "In every case, without
exception; a critical tension situation of one kind or another invariably preceded the
embezzlement behavior." s Similarly Cressey, in his recent book, OTmER PEOPLE'S
MoNEY, developed a modified situational theory of trust violation:
Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as having a financial
problem which is non-shareable, are aware that this problem can be secretly resolved by violation
of the position of financial trust, and are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted
funds or property.1 9

Such theories may have validity with reference to the "chance offender" (assuming
for the moment that the "chance" offender is not merely a persistent offender who
got caught early in the game); to explain the persistent swindler we need a theory
which transcends the situational approach. In any case, since various types of fraud
abound in modem American society, we must look to our present social system for
clues to explain the great drawing-power the roles of swindler and victim currently
display.
C. Wright Mills, who has perhaps sensed the crux of the problem, states:
Many of the problems of "white-collar crime" and of relaxed public morality, of high-priced vice
and of fading personal integrity, are problems of structural immorality. They are not merely the
problem of the small character twisted by the bad milieu. And many people are at least vaguely
aware that this is so. As news of higher immoralities breaks, they often say, "Well, another one got
caught today," thereby implying that the cases disclosed are not odd events involving occasional
characters but symptoms of a widespread condition. There is good probative evidence that they
are right. 0

In attempting to understand how such a "widespread condition" influences crime
patterns, we should perhaps take for a lead the notion of the French sociologist
Gabriel Tarde that "All the important acts of social life are carried out under the
domination of example." Tarde asserted that: "Criminality always being... a
phenomenon of imitative propagation... the aim is to discover... which among these
various spreadings of example which are called instruction, religion, politics, commerce, industry, are the ones that foster, and which the ones that impede, the expan2
sion of crime." '
One system of values which may foster crime, and particularly fraud, in our society,
is that relating to the phenomenon of salesmanship. As Sutherland notes, "The
confidence games are based essentially on salesmanship ...."2 To a great extent our
society is built on salesmanship, and the term implies much more than the mere sale
of material goods. In an era when an increased premium is being put on "idea men,"
the ability to "sell a bill of goods" (in the figurative sense as well as the literal) takes
on added importance. It is just this ability which the successful con man must demon-

I8 LOTZER, Srftu.T,A

Tension Theory of Criminzal Behavior, 7 AmERz.SocioL. R.Ev. 840 (1942).
19CRESSEY, DONAiD R., OTHER PEoPLE's MONEY: A STUDY nz Tm SocIAL PsYcHOLoGY or
EmBEZZEmENT, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953, p. 30.
20
Mns, C. WRIGHT, THE POWER ELTE, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956, pp. 343-344.
*TARDE GABPRmL, PENAL PHLosoHY, tr. Howell, Boston: Little Brown, 1912, p. 362.
SSU=TPJAND, PRINCIPLEs OF CRTUMOLOGY, p. 233.
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strate. Closely related to "selling a bill of goods" is the cultural stress on "putting
across" one's "personality." We are all quite familiar with the importance in modem
American society of being "well liked," of getting along and of being a "good mixer."
These socially-sanctioned attributes are the very hallmark of the experienced swindler. Maurer notes that con men, "... have cultivated the social side more than any
other criminal group. They are able to fit in unobtrusively on any social level .... Although their culture is not very deep, it is surprisingly wide and versatile."' 7
Though women frequently act as lures or accomplices in certain con games, fullfledged confidence swindling seems to be primarily a male offense in this country.
Since nothing is required for the commission of fraudulent acts which would be
beyond the physiological capacities or social opportunities of women, the fact that
swindlers are predominantly male tends to underscore the influence of general social
values in shaping patterns of fraud. The specific attributes of the swindler tend to be
typically male attributes under our present social system. This is generally true of the
ability to sell things and of having a successful "personality;" certainly, "coming up
with an idea," "putting an idea across" and convincing others are held to be almost
exclusively within the masculine domain. It may be interesting also to note that the
role of confidant (which the swindler usually takes on, often with great success), be
it in the form of priest, lawyer, doctor or psychoanalyst, is characteristically taken by
a male in our society. Quite likely, we should expect an increase in female fraud in
the future. Otto Pollak has noted that, ".. . an increase in female crimes against

property is a concomitant of the social emancipation of women."24 As the "idea
woman" comes more and more into vogue, the "confidence woman" may cease to be a
rarity. What affect this will have on the total extent of fraudulent crime remains to
be seen.
Reinforcing the rationalizations which the social system provides the swindler,
and further inciting his depredations, is the seemingly unlimited supply of victims.
Businessmen seem particularly likely marks; as von Hentig has noted, "There is...
general consensus that businessmen are excellent victims in all respects."25 This
must be at least partly attributed to certain values of the business community which
seem to underlie the trend to what Mills terms a "structural immorality." As Donald
Taft comments:
...success is based somewhat increasingly upon financial gain similar to that of the banker or
speculator rather than upon that of the old-fashioned industrialist whose fun was in the day's work.
Whatever the economists may say, speculative gains look more like luck than26hard work, and more
nearly approximate the something-for-nothing philosophy of the pickpocket.

Similarly, a probable influence on victim behavior is risk-taking, a generally approved
activity which appears in numerous forms throughout our social life. The high value
placed on risk-taking underlies the characteristic zeal for success which has played an
integral part in shaping patterns of American social mobility. As Geoffrey Gorer has
2MAUlER, op. cit.,p. 186.
'POLLAK,

OTTo, THE

CRIMINALITY OF WOMN, Philadelphia:

Univ. of Pennsylvania Press,

1950, p. 75.
5

2 VON HENTIG, op. cit., p. 435.
26 TAFr, DONALD R., CRIMINOLOGY,

New York: Macmillan, rev. ed. 1950, p. 231.
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observed, "Gambling is... a respected and important component in many business
ventures.... Like the gambler 'for fun' the American businessman is generally
prepared to take proportionately far greater risks than his European equivalent."7
The victim, then, like the swindler, can easily take advantage of conflicting and
overlapping patterns of expected behavior to justify his participation in fraudulent
schemes. And in the swindler, who is the idea man, the convincer, (and who thus in
part typifies the leader), the victim may see something of his own (real or hoped-for)
image; it may be this image to which he responds.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME

According to Professor Sutherland's "differential association" theory, "A person
becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law
over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.' ' s While the impact of such "definitions" is evident in much of what I have suggested above, it may be more useful to
view value orientation on the social-system level, rather than membership in particular social groups within that system, as the prime vehicle for assimilation of the
definitions. Furthermore, at least insofar as it is offered as a general theory of all
crime, the differential association theory is negligent in limiting the subject matter
of criminology to the understanding of the individual offender. As Clarence Jeffery
has remarked in his highly valuable article, "Crime must be studied as an aspect of
institutional systems. Institutions, not individual offenders, should be the subject
matter of criminology." Under such an approach, "The concept of cause is replaced
by one of function."'
"Structural-functional" sociology indeed offers much that is fruitful for analysis
of the sociology of crime. According to this view, "deviance is always relative to a
given institutionalized value-pattern system .... ",0 Sutherland at least sensed this
basic unity of legality and illegality, as evidenced by his thesis that essentially the
same sort of processes which result in lawful behavior also result in unlawful behavior.
Structural-functional aralysis makes clear that a given item may have "diverse
consequences, functional and dysfunctional, for individuals, for sub-groups, and for
the more inclusive social structure and culture." 31 Thus crime, usually thought of as
negative and disorganizing, can serve positive as well as negative functions within
the social system. While there has been sIme recognition of possible economic functions of crimen, other social functions of crime are less frequently recognized.
The distinction between "manifest" and "latent" functions, "aids the sociological
interpretation of many social practices which persist even though their manifest
purpose is clearly not achieved." This idea may be particularly useful in analysis
GEOPREY, THE AMERIcAN PEOPLE, NqW York: Norton, 1948, p. 178.
2GORER,
8

2 SUTHERLAND, PRINcIPLES Or CRIKiNOLOGY, p. 78.

2 JEFFREY, CLARENCE R., Crime, Law and Social Structure. Part I.- Methodology, 47 J. CRnM.
LAW, CRIMINOL. & POLICE Scr. 423 (1956).

30PARsoNs,

TALcoIT, THE SOCIAL SYSTEm, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951, p. 283.

"LMERTON, ROBERT, SOCIAL THEORY

AND

SOCIAL STRUCTURE, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949,

1951, p. 32.
S HAWKINS, E. R. AND WILLARD WALLER, Critical Notes on the Cost of Crime, 26 J. CRIM. LAW
AND CRnNOL.

684 (1936).

13 MERTON, op. cit., p. 64.
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of seemingly unenforceable criminal laws; I have elsewhere tried to apply such an
analysis to our current laws against abortion., Since our fraud laws are rarely applied,
and when applied do not seem effective, why do we maintain them in their present
form? The answer may lie in the important functions served by the practices nominally sought to be outlawed; we might well ask ourselves-could we really afford to
effectively curtail fraud?
Structural-functional analysis has underscored the fact that in order to eliminate
an existing social structure one must first provide the necessary "functional alternatives." This should make evident the futility of attempting to curb fraud by merely
increasing penalties. Rusche and Kirchheimer have quite rightly stressed this "uselessess of shifting penal policies as a weapon against socially determined variations
in the crime rate."" Just what sort of adjustment in the social system must be made
is uncertain, but the idea that radical changes are needed is not new. Sutherland, for
example, recognized that "adequate control of professional crime cannot be attained
by proceeding against thieves one at a time either by punitive or by reformative
policies. Control calls, in addition, for modifications in the general social order out
of which professional theft grows.""6 Perhaps the only real hope for a major reduction
of fraud lies in such changes as may gradually result from an informed questioning
of some of our prevailing social value systems.
Criminology has been seriously hampered in the past by its refusal to abandon the
"social welfare approach" in favor of a truly sociological orientation. The former, as
Kingsley Davis suggests, labors under the like-causes-like fallacy, here the idea that
evil causes evil. To adopt a genuinely sociological mode of analysis, criminology must
first of all recognize that "the contramoral is always functionally related to the
,7 With such recognition as a starting point, the phrase "sociology of
moral ....
crime" begins to take on real meaning.
4

ScHRa,E. M,, Abortion and the Social System, 3 SocIAL PROBLEMS 94 (1955).
GEORG AND OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, New
Columbia Univ. Press, 1939, p. 201.
36SUTHERLAND, THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF, p. 229.
3DAvis, KINGSLEY, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AMER. J. SocloL. 215 (1939).
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